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1Executive Summary
Since the birth of the European Monetary Union, issues related to the nature of optimal
currency areas have gained in importance both in the academic literature and in the eco-
nomic policy discussion. Synchronization of business cycles appears as the most relevant
measure to evaluate the degree of optimality of monetary unions and the evaluation of the
determinants of cyclical synchronization informs policymakers about the potential economic
policy challenges that Europe currently faces.
In our analysis we assess the importance of scal policy and trade orientation as factors
driving cyclical comovements in Europe in the last decades. Trade and scal policy variables
aect business cycle developments and are at the same time aected by the current cyclical
stance. This is more the case in the framework of currency areas, where the endogeneity of
optimal currency area criteria has been both predicted theoretically and documented em-
pirically. Our econometric analysis recognizes such endogeneity and utilizes political and
institutional determinants of public nance and trade as instrumental variables in order to
quantify their eect on business cycle synchronization in the European Union.
Using newly-developed measures of business cycle comovement within economic areas, our
results indicate that scal policy shocks and changes in intra-EU trade orientation are ro-
bustly related to the degree of synchronization that countries have within Europe. Countries
running into budget decits and with trade orientation towards areas outside the EU tend
to have more asynchronous business cycle dynamics with respect to the rest of the European
economies. Furthermore, a higher degree of synchronization of business cycles tends to hap-
pen in recessions as compared to expansionary phases.
The analysis has important consequences for the design of policy frameworks aimed at min-
imizing the costs of carrying out monetary policy in EMU. In particular, the results indicate
that supervision and coordination of scal policy should play a central role in order to ensure
the correct functioning of interest rate policy in EMU. This conclusion is more relevant in
the framework of the eects of the nancial crisis and the subsequent recession. An extra
eort should be put in applying sustainable consolidation measures once that the scal im-
pulses currently in place are considered sucient to support improvements in the cyclical
stance. Failure to implement such measures could lead to diculties in the implementation
of monetary policy in the euro area.
2Zusammenfassung
Mit der Entstehung der Europ aischen W ahrungsunion gewann die Theorie optimaler W ahrungs-
r aume in der akademischen Forschung sowie in der wirtschaftspolitischen Diskussion an
Bedeutung. Die Synchronisation von Konjunkturzyklen stellt eines der wichtigsten Ma se
zur Beurteilung der Optimalit at einer W ahrungsunion dar. Die Untersuchung jener Fak-
toren, welche einen Einuss auf den konjunkturellen Gleichlauf in Europa haben, ist f ur
die wirtschaftspolitischen Akteure daher eine bedeutende Information in Hinblick auf die
gegenw artigen und zuk unftigen Herausforderungen f ur die W ahrungsunion.
Unsere Analyse quantiziert die Rolle von Fiskalpolitik und Handelsorientierung als Bestim-
mungsfaktoren der Synchronisation von Konjunturzyklen in Europa. Beide Faktoren beein-
ussen und werden selbst von aggregierten Konjunkturschwankungen beeinusst. Diese En-
dogenit at der Kriterien eines optimalen W ahrungsraumes wurde von der Theorie diskutiert
und empirisch gezeigt. Unsere  okonometrische Analyse ber ucksichtigt diese Endogenit at und
verwendet politische und institutionelle Variablen um die exogene Variation in der Fiskalpoli-
tik und im Handel zu identizieren. Damit kann der Eekt von diesen Variablen auf die
Synchronisation der Konjunkturzyklen richtig quantiziert werden.
Die Studie verwendet eine neue Methode zur Messung der Synchronisation von Konjunk-
turzyklen. Unsere Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass skalpolitische Schocks und Handel-
sorientierung einen robusten Eekt auf die Synchronisation von Konjunkturschwankungen in
Europa haben. L ander mit einem hohen Budgetdezit und/oder einem relativen kleinen An-
teil am internationalen Handel mit anderen EU-L andern haben relativ asynchrone Konjunk-
turzyklen in der Europ aischen Union. Generell sind Konjunkturzyklen in Europa w ahrend
einer Rezession st arker synchronisiert als w ahrend einer Expansion.
Aus unserer Analyse k onnen wichtige wirtschaftspolitische Folgerungen gezogen werden.
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die  Uberwachung und die Koordination von Fiskalpolitik
in Europa eine zentrale Rolle spielen um eine einwandfreie Funktion der Geldpolitik zu
erm oglichen. Diese Schlussfolgerung ist insbesondere f ur die Beurteilung der Auswirkungen
der Finanzkrise und der daraus folgenden Rezession relevant. Sobald die skalischen Impulse
zur Belebung der Konjunktur als ausreichend erachtet werden, ist eine nachhaltige skalische
Konsolidierung notwendig, um die reibungslose Implementierung der Geldpolitik nach der
Rezession sicherzustellen.
31 Introduction
The European Monetary Union (EMU) constitutes the most advanced status of association
within the European integration process. Although under continuous debate, its performance
hitherto has been considered to some extent noteworthy and the current common monetary
policy is seen as a successful prototype of policy for more integration (see, Alesina and Per-
otti, 2004, for example). The implementation of the common monetary policy constitutes
a dicult task in the context of the institutional framework of the European Union (EU)
(see, De Neve, 2007, for an exposition on the complexity of the institutional architecture of
the EU). The European Central Bank (ECB) implements monetary policy based on euro
area aggregates for a heterogeneous group of countries, which in turn keep some stabilization
power by means of their national sovereignty, in particular in terms of scal policy. Due to
the structural heterogeneity in the economies forming the eurozone, as well as in the trans-
mission mechanism of common monetary policy shocks, the conduct of monetary policy in
EMU may be a potential source of asymmetric shocks in the economic area. Heterogeneity
in monetary transmission mechanisms within euro area countries is fairly well documented
in the empirical literature. There is evidence concerning dierences in reactions to mon-
etary shocks in countries in the eurozone (see, for example, Huchet, 2003, and Caporale
and Soliman, 2009), as well as evidence on the heterogeneity in the interest rate channel in
EMU countries (see, for example, Sander and Kleimeier, 2004, Srensen and Werner, 2006,
or Fern andez-Amador, 2010). Nevertheless, the main problem of monetary policy in a single
currency area is given by asymmetric shocks, much more than by the asymmetric transmis-
sion of common shocks. As highlighted by Mundell(1961), when asymmetric shocks hit the
economies in a currency union, which have lost their exchange rate and monetary policies
in favor of a supranational entity, there must exist a channel for adjustment towards a new
equilibrium, namely wage exibility and labor mobility. These are the aspects that were
highlighted by Mundell (1961) in what became known as Optimum Currency Area (OCA)
theory.
Together with wage exibility and labor mobility, many economic aspects have been con-
sidered by the OCA literature in order to assess optimality of currency areas. Openness,
nancial integration, exibility of prices, similarity of ination rates, diversication in pro-
duction and consumption, scal integration and political integration are some of these factors
which have been explicitly assessed in the literature (see Tavlas, 1993, or Mongelli, 2002, or
Dellas and Tavlas, 2009, for surveys). Strong integration in such OCA criteria is the con-
dition for minimizing the costs from monetary union (loss of monetary and exchange-rate
policies) and so, for optimality of the currency area. They are often summarized through
synchronization of shocks/business cycles of the members forming the currency area. Inso-
far as shocks are less asymmetric or cyclical developments are more synchronized, common
monetary policy will t the interests of the members of the currency union. The more syn-
chronized the business cycles of the members of the currency area, the lower the probability
of asymmetric shocks, and the less dramatic the costs of the loss of monetary and exchange
rate policy for the member country (see Afonso and Furceri, 2008, for a theoretical model).
Stylized facts of business cycle synchronization in EMU have been documented under a
unied methodological framework based on sigma-convergence by Crespo-Cuaresma and
4Fern andez-Amador (2010). A period of convergence in cyclical patterns in EMU is present
from the nineties (see also Angeloni and Dedola, 1999, Massmann and Mitchell, 2003, Darvas
and Sz apari, 2005, Afonso and Furceri, 2008) and some evidence of increasing heterogeneity
during the recession of 2000-2002 (documented by Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2004, as well).
Secondly, a core group of EMU countries shows higher synchronization. Thirdly, some new
EU countries of the recent enlargements of 2004 and 2007 present similar rates of comove-
ment to those displayed by some of the periphery (EMU-12) members, as has been also
documented by Artis et al. (2004), Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2004 and 2006), Darvas and
Sz apari (2005) and Afonso and Furceri (2008). Finally, the European dierential existing
during the nineties as compared with other industrialized economies has disappeared, dilut-
ing the European business cycle within a global cycle (see also Artis, 2003, and P erez et al.,
2007). One question arises from those stylized facts summarized here, which is the main
research question in this study: what is the nature of the factors driving cyclical synchro-
nization in Europe?
The empirical literature has highlighted some specic determinants of cyclical synchroniza-
tion. In particular, trade has been put forward as one of the main drivers of comovement
at the cyclical frequency (see, for example, Otto et al., 2001, or Baxter and Kouparitsas,
2005), but its eect does not seem to be robust for all levels of trade integration and other
factors such as scal decits and correlation of monetary policies are found to have a com-
parable eect on business cycle synchronization when trade integration is high (Inklaar et
al., 2008). Endogeneity plays an important role when assessing the determinants of busi-
ness cycle comovement. Many variables are likely to improve the degree of optimality of a
currency area at the moment when the removal of borders from monetary integration takes
place. A consequence of such endogeneities is that a country that ex ante does not satify
the requirements for being an optimal member of a monetary union may accomplish those
prerequisites ex post (Frankel and Rose, 1998). In this sense, several sources of endogeneity
have been highlighted in the recent literature. In particular, those between business cycle
synchronization and trade integration, and between business cycle synchronization and -
nancial integration have been studied in depth (see De Grauwe and Mongelli, 2005, for an
assessment of endogeneities of OCA-criteria). However, other sources of endogeneity arise
between, for example, scal policy and business cycle, that have not received the same at-
tention.
In this study, we analyze the eect of scal policy and trade integration as determinants
of cyclical synchronization in the EU for the period 1995-2008. We make use of the busi-
ness cycle synchronization indicator developed by Crespo-Cuaresma and Fern andez-Amador
(2010) and assess the role of those potential drivers of cyclical synchronization taking into
consideration the endogeneity between them by using as instruments for scal policy and
trade integration. We exploit the information on political determinants of scal stance
(years remaining of term and share of government votes), and a combination of income
per capita trends, geographical and institutional dummies (for periphery countries, EU and
EMU/opting-out membership), and a measure of trade specialization in order to obtain in-
struments for our explanatory variables.
5The next section reviews the literature on determinants of business cycle synchronization
with a focus on the role of trade and scal policy. Section 3 analyzes the issues of the
measurement of business cycle and business cycle synchronization and shows the estimates
of our measure for the EU-25. In Section 4 we assess the role of scal policy and trade
as a determinant of such a synchronization measure, dealing with the issue of potential
endogeneity of scal and trade variables. Section 5 concludes.
2 Business cycle synchronization, trade and scal pol-
icy: a review
Many economic channels have been considered by the OCA literature to explain the po-
tential mechanisms for equilibrium correction after a demand shock in the framework of a
monetary union when asymmetric shocks are present. Strong integration in terms of those
OCA criteria is the condition for minimizing costs from monetary union (loss of monetary
and exchange-rate policies) and thus for optimality of the currency area. Those OCA criteria
are labor mobility, economic openness, nancial integration, exibility of prices and wages,
similarity of ination rates, diversication in production and consumption, scal integration
and political integration.Often, these variables are thought of as being summarized well by
business cycle synchronization measures (see Tavlas, 1993, or Mongelli, 2002, or Dellas and
Tavlas, 2009, for surveys). Among those OCA criteria, several authors have concluded that
trade integration and scal policy are two of the most robust and important drivers of cycli-
cal comovement.
McKinnon (1963) highlights that the more open an economy is, the more changes in in-
ternational prices would impact (directly and indirectly) on domestic prices, reducing the
potential for money or exchange rate illusion. Frankel and Rose (1998) assessed the empirical
relationship between trade integration and cyclical synchronization under the \endogeneity
of OCA" hypothesis, by which the structure and relations of the economies that join a cur-
rency area are assumed to change dramatically as a result of the eective participation in
the currency area. Trade endogeneity, as analyzed by Frankel and Rose (1998), is theoret-
ically ambiguous. The increase in trade after joining a monetary union may induce more
synchronization in business cycles if intra-industry trade dominates over inter-industry trade
(see European Commission, 1990) or, on the other hand, may induce business cycles to be-
come more idiosyncratic if countries become more specialized as a result of the prevalence of
inter-industry trade over the rest of eects (see Krugman, 1991). Frankel and Rose (1998)
found evidence that international trade integration is positively related to more synchronized
business cycles. Afterwards, Rose (2000) opened a door for supporting the idea of a positive
eect of EMU on trade, although his research is subject to some drawbacks (see Baldwin,
2006) and several other authors have not been able to nd such a robust EMU eect (see,
for example, Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005, or Inklaar et al., 2008).
With regard to scal policy, the relevance of the relationship between between the scal
stance and business cycle synchronization has also been emphasized by the OCA literature.
As a driver of business cycle synchronization, scal policy has several roles (see Mongelli,
2002). Firstly, scal policy has an stabilization role at a national level in the EU, helping
6smooth the cycle within the institutional framework determined by the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP). Secondly, as a potential source of asymmetric shocks, convergence in terms of
the scal policy stance could be related positively to cyclical comovement. Thirdly, scal
policy could be used as a public risk-sharing mechanism when provided by a supranational
power, a scenario which is not relevant in the current European Union. The rst role men-
tioned allows us to recognize one potential source of endogeneity between business cycle
developments and scal policy. Battaglini and Coate (2008) conclude that scal policy in
US respond to booms and recessions, Darvas et al. (2005) document that convergence in
scal balances is systematically linked to business cycle convergence, and that the relation-
ship exists even when the potential endogeneity of scal policy responses is accounted for.
B ower and Guillemineau (2006) show that scal policy homogeneization has been one of the
robust determinants of business cycle synchronization in EMU, and Akin (2006) provides
evidence of the importance of similarity in idiosyncratic scal shocks as a determinant of
cyclical convergence in a broader set of countries.
There is some theoretical foundation to expect that scal activism will increase after joining
a monetary union due to the fact that the potential costs of running higher decits for a
country in the monetary union are lower than if monetary policy is independent. This is
the case since the costs entailed by the increase of interest rates partly fall on other member
countries (Onorante, 2004). Thus, a country experiencing large decits and high debt-to-
GDP ratios within a monetary union may create negative spillover eects for the rest of
the currency area, increasing the interest rate of the monetary union and thus, the load
of nancing government debts in other members of the currency area (De Grauwe, 2007).1
Theoretically, scal coordination appears as a necessary political framework in order to en-
sure some cyclical synchronization and the correct implementation of the monetary policy
across the members of the monetary union. However, the way in which countries of a mon-
etary union actually coordinate scal policies could condition the impact of scal policy on
business cycle synchronization. Von Hagen and Mundschenk (2001) dierentiate between
two main ways of policy coordination: narrow coordination, focused on monitoring national
policies and practices challenging price stability, leaving relative freedom to policy goals and
instruments, and broad coordination, where explicit frameworks concerning common policy
goals and strategies are developed in an agreement. In this line, Ferr e (2008) shows in a
game theoretical model that broad coordination in scal policy would be preferred to nar-
row coordination. In this broad coordination framework, the incentive to deviate from the
agreement comes from the presence of supply shocks and dierent evolutions in competitive-
ness, whereas there is no incentive to deviate from the agreement under dierential demand
shocks, the most important from the point of view of stabilization policies. Recently, there
is evidence that the shock-smoothing role of scal policy is enhanced in an enlarged EMU
(Afonso and Furceri, 2008).
Our approach to the relationship between scal policy, trade integration and business cycle
synchronization is quite dierent from the rest of the literature. We consider the business
cycle synchronization measure put forward by Crespo-Cuaresma and Fern andez-Amador
(2010) as the relevant measure of cyclical synchronization. This measure, as opposed to
1See, for example, Silbert (1992), Levine and Brociner (1994) or Dixit and Lambertini (2001 and 2003)
for theoretical models of the interaction between monetary and scal policy in monetary unions.
7bilateral correlations, allows for a more detailed analysis of the dynamics of business cycle
coherence and takes into account the role of each country within the particular group which
is taken as a reference. In the next section, we dene and analyze such a measure of cyclical
comovement.
3 Measuring business cycle synchronization
Business cycle measurement is plagued with controversy. Measuring business cycles consti-
tutes the rst step in order to study them, but what the business cycle is seems to be an
issue which far from being unanimously agreed upon. The empirical literature on business
cycle measurement has produced several denitions and methods for measuring the eco-
nomic cycle. Harding and Pagan (2005) classify most of these methods and Canova (1998)
and Massmann and Mitchell (2003) emphasize the sensitivity of some results to the method
employed in order to isolate the business cycle. The literature concerning the determinants
of business cycle synchronization has focused on some specic lters when extracting the
cyclical component of the main economic aggregate, real Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Frankel and Rose (1998) make use of fourth-dierencing, linear detrending and Hodrick-
Prescott (HP, 1997) ltering upon four aggregates representing real economic activity: real
GDP, Industrial Production Index (IPI), total employment and unemployment rate; at a
quarterly frequency. Otto et al. (2001) consider the growth rate of real GDP. Baxter and
Kouparitsas (2005) focus on Baxter-King (1999) lter applied on annual real GDP. Inklaar
et al. (2008) extract the cyclical component by using the Baxter-King (1999) lter for real
GDP and IPI. After that, all these authors focus on (rolling-window) bilateral-country cor-
relations of the cyclical components in order to measure cyclical synchronization.
In order to study the determinants of synchronization of business cycles, an estimate of the
cyclical component of the variable of interest (in our case, quarterly real GDP) needs to
be obtained. For this purpose, following Harvey (1989) and Harvey and Jaeger (1993), we
decompose the GDP series of each of the 25 countries under study into unobservable trend,
cyclical and irregular components. Let yit be the (logged) level of GDP corresponding to
country i in period t then
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for i 2 [0;1], i 2 (0;) and  = diag(2
;2
), so the disturbances of the cyclical com-
ponent are assumed independent and of equal variance. It can be easily shown that the
specication given by (4) implies that the cycle follows an ARMA(2,1) process, and that the
constraints on the parameter space given above restrict the roots of the lag polynomial to
lie on the region of the parameter space that leads to pseudo-cyclical behaviour in it.
The model specied by (1)), (2), (3) and (4) can be written in state space form in a straight-
forward manner and estimated using maximum likelihood methods via the Kalman (1961)
lter and the prediction error decomposition. Once the estimates of the parameters in (1)-(4)
are obtained, the cyclical component can be recovered as the smoothed estimate of it, ^ it,
which is given by E(itjfyitgT
t=1).
The unobserved components model given by (1)-(4) is estimated for real quarterly GDP data
corresponding to all EU countries, with the exception of Malta and Romania.3
Using such a structural unobserved components model has several important advantages
with respect to other common ltering techniques. This is of special relevance in our re-
search, since properties of measures based on ltered cyclical components could be sensitive
to the ltering method employed. Firstly, as mentioned above, the model specied nests
some other lters like the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) and linear detrending or rst-dierencing
and thus oers more exibility when extracting the components. Secondly, it implicitly spec-
ies a band of frequencies which corresponds to the business cycle, removing the long-run
and irregular information. However, in contrast to the Baxter-King (1999) lter, it does not
specify a priori the band of frequencies.4 Thirdly, it allows for a rationale underlying the
signal-extracting procedure and makes parametric assumptions concerning the data generat-
ing process. The latter is of importance when tracking the business cycle especially for two
reasons. Part of the economies considered in the sample are Eastern European economies
2The Hodrick-Prescott (1997) trend appears as a special case of the decomposition of a series into a
smooth trend and an irregular component for specic values of 2
"=2
"y = , and 2
" = 0 and t = 0, where
 is the smoothing parameter of the Hodrick-Prescott lter. When  ! 1, the Hodrick-Prescott lter
approaches linear detrending. The Hodrick-Prescott estimate of the cyclical component is then simply given
by the smoothed irregular component (see Harvey, 1989, and Harvey and Jaeger, 1993).
3GDP series of Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Latvia and Slovenia were seasonally adjusted using TRAMO-
SEATS (G omez and Maravall, 1996). Appendix A gives further details concerning the sources of GDP data,
as well as the sample period used for the estimation in each country.
4Baxter and King (1999) quoted Burns and Mitchell (1946) when specifying the limits of 2 and 8 years
for the cyclical frequencies. However, a careful reading of Burns and Mitchell's (1946) denition of what a
business cycle is allows for a higher upper bound. In some cases, as in Portugal, this is important, since
there is evidence of some longer cyclical swings.
9which joined the EU in the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds. These countries are transition
economies which experienced a particular type of crisis during the nineties, associated to a
transition process where political constraints were of capital importance (Roland, 2002).5 In
addition to this, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) conclude that shocks to trend growth rather
than transitory uctuations around the trend are the primary source of observed volatil-
ity in emerging markets. The unobserved components model allows us to take account of
sharp drops in GDP series occurred during some periods of time, for example, in the case of
the Finnish great depression in the nineties (see Conesa et al., 2007, for an analysis of this
case).6 The proposed model can deal with these features by allowing a exible estimation
of movements in the trend component. We estimate the cyclical components of GDP series
for all the countries considered using the Harvey and Jaeger (1993) model and the two most
common lters found in the literature, namely the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) and Baxter-King
(1999) lters.
Figure 3 presents the (smoothed) cyclical components of the quarterly GDP series corre-
sponding to each one of the countries considered for the three lters proposed for the period
1995-2008. As can be easily seen the estimated components are quite similar. The syn-
chronization among countries forming a group can be analyzed using the time series of the
cross-country standard deviation of the (smoothed) cyclical component. Figure 3 plots the
time series of the cross-country standard deviation of the cyclical component across EU-25
countries. The dynamics of the dispersion series is also quite similar and thus, we should
not expect that our results are sensitive to the lter employed at this step. However, as in
the estimation of the cyclical components, it is quite obvious that Hodrick-Prescott (1997)
estimates are more volatile than Harvey-Jaeger (1993) and Baxter-King (1999) estimates,
because the method does not explicitly isolate the cyclical component from the irregular
component. In all the estimates, the trend of synchronization shows a period of convergence
during the second half of the nineties until 2002, when a stable period appears, only reect-
ing some signs of divergence from 2007 onwards (2006 for the HP estimate).
We propose to analyze the degree of synchronization of a country i in the group 
 using
an indicator which measures the relative dierence in business cycle dispersion in the group
of reference with and without the inclusion of the country. The indicator, put forward by










 i is the cross-country standard deviation of smoothed cycles corresponding to the
group 
 excluding country i and ^ Stj
 is the cross-country standard deviation of smoothed
5Campos and Coricelli (2002) characterized some stylized facts of transition economies during the nineties
such as output fall, a dramatic decrease in the stock of physical capital, high geographic labor mobility,
intense reorientation of trade towards the West, a change in the structure of the economy, a rapid collapse
of institutions and a deterioration of social well-being (see also, Svejnar, 2002, and Foster and Stehrer, 2007,
for characterizations of macroeconomic transitions during this period).
6Conesa et al. (2007) use the Finnish depression as a case study for great depressions methodology
developed by Kehoe and Prescott (2002 and 2007), recognizing that such a depression does not fulll the
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Figure 1: Cyclical component estimates for all EU-25 countries: Harvey-Jaeger, Baxter King













Figure 2: Standard deviation of the cyclical component estimates for EU-25 countries:
Harvey-Jaeger, Baxter King and Hodrick-Prescott methods, 1995-2008
cycles for the group 
 including country i, both evaluated at time t. The indicator takes
negative values when the standard deviation of the group increases as the country is included
(that is, when the country induces cyclical divergence in the group), and positive values when
the inclusion of the country induces a decrease in the dispersion (that is, when it induces
cyclical convergence in the group).
We computed the measure of synchronization using the cyclical components estimated with
the three dierent lters proposed and they are presented in Figure ??. There are important
dierences in most of the countries considered. Due to the transformation induced by 5
to the cyclical components estimated, it is necessary for our purposes to rely on the less
restrictive lter method, in our case the Harvey-Jaeger (1993) model. This indicator is the
dependent variable in our econometric models and Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics
of the synchronization measure for the sample used in the estimations, which ranges from
1995 to 2008. The original measure was estimated using quarterly data and averaged by year.
Table 1 reveals that the countries which tend to be desynchronized with the EU-25 in the
period under study are in general peripheral economies (with the remarkable exception of
Luxembourg). Furthermore, the correlation between the mean and the standard deviation
of the synchronization measure across countries for the full period equals -0.9, which implies
that the persistence of desynchronization periods is relatively limited. Figure 3 presents the
scatterplot of the cyclical component of GDP against the synchronization indicator for the

















































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Synchronization measures: Harvey-Jaeger, Baxter King and Hodrick-Prescott
methods, 1995-2008
13Table 1: Synchronization measure: Descriptive statistics, 1995-2008
Country Mean Stand. dev. Maximum Minimum
AUT 0.017 0.005 0.021 0.005
BEL 0.017 0.004 0.021 0.007
BGR -0.020 0.063 0.021 -0.166
CYP 0.009 0.014 0.020 -0.033
CZE 0.002 0.026 0.020 -0.079
DEU 0.011 0.013 0.021 -0.028
DNK 0.015 0.007 0.021 -0.004
ESP 0.011 0.006 0.020 -0.002
EST -0.001 0.020 0.020 -0.054
FIN 0.003 0.020 0.020 -0.051
FRA 0.019 0.001 0.021 0.017
GBR 0.009 0.016 0.021 -0.027
GRC -0.008 0.042 0.019 -0.138
HUN 0.016 0.005 0.021 0.006
IRL -0.030 0.070 0.021 -0.192
ITA 0.017 0.005 0.021 0.002
LTU -0.024 0.043 0.019 -0.134
LUX -0.056 0.047 0.010 -0.118
LVA 0.007 0.008 0.020 -0.008
NLD 0.018 0.003 0.021 0.009
POL -0.056 0.067 0.017 -0.178
PRT -0.008 0.034 0.018 -0.086
SVK 0.005 0.013 0.021 -0.015
SVN 0.002 0.017 0.019 -0.044
SWE 0.013 0.008 0.021 -0.006
frequency to country-year observations which are in recessive periods (bottom-left quadrant
of the Cartesian plane in Figure 3) as compared to expansive periods (bottom-right quad-
rant). 41 country-year observations correspond to a desynchronization episode in recession
while 49 take place when the country has a positive output gap estimate. The symmetry
of the raw relationship between these two variables is visible in the t of the third-order
polynomial regression line shown in Figure 3. On average, episodes of desynchronization
and adjustment to the common cyclical behavior of European economies appear to happen
in a similar fashion when the deviant country is in expansion as when it is in recession.
The average synchronization and cyclical component in the EU-25 group are presented in
Figure 3 for the period 1995-2008. EU economies tended to be in expansionary phases when
the average degree of synchronization was highest, although the recessionary phase of the
beginning of the millennium was accompanied by an increase in the synchronization measure,
which falls at the end of our sample in parallel to the beginning of the global recession of
2008. To the extent that cyclical dynamics in Europe are partly driven by common shocks,
Figure 3 is not particularly informative about the driving factors of cyclical coherence at
the country level. A deeper statistical analysis is required to assess the nature of the factors
driving synchronization of cycles and, in particular, the role played by scal policy and trade
integration in the process.
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Figure 5: Cyclical component estimate against synchronization measure, EU-25 countries
1995-2008
154 What drives business cycle synchronization in Eu-
rope?
4.1 Fiscal policy, trade and business cycle synchronization: A rst
assessment
In this section we study the role played by scal policy and trade integration as a determinant
of business cycle synchronization in Europe. The basic econometric specication we are
interested in is given by
synchroit = Fit + Tit + Zit + "it; (6)
where Fit is a vector of scal variables, Tit is a vector of variables related to the degree
of trade integration of country i in Europe and Zit is a group of other controls. The error
term "it is assumed to be composed by a country and a year xed eect. We start by es-
timating specication (6) without considering endogeneity of our explanatory variables, in
order to grasp the partial correlations existing in the data. Table ?? presents the results
of the estimations of several models with dierent explanatory variables.7 Column 1 shows
the results of the regression of the synchronization measure on the cyclical component. The
estimated parameter corresponding to the cyclical component variable is negative and highly
signicant, which indicates that countries tend to synchronize more with the European cycle
in recession periods. If we add the budget surplus as an additional explanatory variable, it
enters signicantly and with a positive parameter estimate. At the individual country level,
business cycle synchronization in Europe over the last decades has thus taken place following
scal consolidation episodes. This partial correlation is mostly driven by the consolidation
process that took place in the run up to the European Monetary Union in the framework
of the Maastricht Treaty. If we split the sample into two periods delimited by the birth of
EMU, the coecient associated to the scal surplus is highly signicant only in the pre-1999
subsample and the estimated parameter is more than twice higher than that of the full sam-
ple.
We turn to the eect of trade integration on our dependent variable. Our rst measure of
trade intensity is a modied version of the measure used by Frankel and Rose (1998) and















where the total trade of a country i with the EU at period t is scaled by the total intra-
European trade of the EU-25. Clark and Van Wincoop (2001) advocate and make use of
this type of scaling to avoid size-dependency. Another measure of trade intensity with the
EU considered here is the share of European trade related to total trade of country i,
7In spite of the fact that endogeneity plays an important role and is dealt with below in detail, we impose















Data on imports and exports for computing those indexes are available from UN COM-
TRADE. We use annual data for the period 1995-2008 to compute (7) and (8).8
Column 3 in Table 2 shows the results of the regression including trade of country i as a
percentage of intra-European trade. This variable enters signicantly with a positive sign,
conrming the idea that trade integration induces more synchronization among countries and
therefore, reduces the costs associated to potentially forming a currency area. This result
is robust to the inclusion of other variables as it is shown in columns 4 to 7. In particular,
column 4 considers the inclusion of our second measure of trade intensity, trade with other
European countries as a percentage of total trade. This measure of European focus of trade
activity does not enter signicantly in the specication and so, the share of European trade
in total trade of a country does not seem to aect the degree of cyclical synchronization
with the EU. This is consistent with the hypothesis of a trade channel in the transmission
of shocks, that is, that shocks imported by countries with small European trade-orientation
but considerable share of European trade are transmitted to the rest of the EU. Further-
more, the trade channel hypothesis would be consistent with the stylized fact that there is a
dilution of the European cycle within a world-wide cycle in the recent years documented by
Artis (2003), P erez et al. (2007) and Crespo-Cuaresma and Fern andez-Amador (2010). In
order to assess the common role of the cyclical stance and the scal policy stance, we add
the interaction of the cyclical component with the scal surplus as an additional covariate
to our model. The inclusion of the interaction does not change the signicance and sign
of the cyclical stance and scal surplus variable, and enters with a marginally signicant
positive parameter. In our sample, countries which exercise anticyclical scal policy are thus
on average more synchronized to the European cycle.
In the last specication of Table 2 we enlarge the specication by including a lag of the
synchronization measure. The lagged dependent variable accounts for the persistence of our
synchronization indicator, to the extent that it is not explained by other controls of the
model. Since the dynamic structure of the model and the relatively short time dimension of
our panel would lead to biased estimates due to the induced correlation between the lagged
dependent variable and the error term, we use the GMM method proposed by Arellano and
Bond (1991) to estimate the model.9 The results indicate that there is no signicant per-
sistence above that explained by the independent variables and the use of this specication
does not change our conclusions concerning the importance of trade orientation and scal
stance on business cycle synchronization.
The natural reaction of the budget surplus to business cycle dynamics through the action
of automatic stabilizers calls for a more detailed analysis of the changes in scal positions
8Data for Belgium in the period 1995-1998 are sourced from the National Bank of Belgium (Foreign Trade
Statistics).
9We only instrument the lagged dependent variable for the estimation. Below we deal explicitly with the
endogeneity of the other variables in the model.
17that can be attributed to shocks which are exogenous to economic activity. While the en-
dogeneity caused by automatic stabilizers appears obvious at rst sight, it is not the only
argument put forward from a theoretical perspective to rationalize the feedback eect of
business cycle volatility on scal variables. Rodrik (1998) notes that if governments aim
at stabilizing cyclical dynamics, economies with higher volatility in economic activity would
choose larger governments to stabilize their cycles. As mentioned above, endogeneity of cycli-
cal synchronization and trade integration is accepted both theoretically and empirically. The
endogeneity of scal and trade integration variables in 2 leads to potentially biased estimates




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































194.2 Exogenous shocks in scal policy: Political determinants of
budget decits in Europe
The potential endogeneity problems discussed above require instrumental variables to ac-
count statistically for the fact that a positive correlation exists between shocks to business
cycle synchronization and scal shocks. There is a vast empirical literature dealing with the
political determinants of the scal stance which can serve us as a guide for the search of
reasonable instruments for the budget surplus in (2). Political variables such as the timing
of elections, the relative importance of the government versus the opposition or the political
ideology of the government have been put forward as determinants of the observed dierences
in budget decits across countries. Alesina and Perotti (1995) presents a survey summarizing
the empirical literature on the role of institutional and political factors as determinants of
scal outcomes. While the literature has mostly dealt with explaining dierences in pub-
lic decits among OECD economies, Woo (2003) presents evidence for a broader sample of
developed and developing countries and reaches the conclusion that political variables are
robustly related to decits at a global level, and not only in the developed world.
We assess the importance of political determinants of budget decits in the EU sample in
order to obtain potential instruments for the scal variable in our main model for business
cycle synchronization. The econometric analysis also helps us test hypotheses of the litera-
ture concerning how the characteristics of the political sphere aect scal policy in Europe.
We construct an econometric model that, in addition to economic variables which have been
proposed as determinants of public decits, we include two political variables: the number
of years left from the current term of the government and the share of votes obtained by the
government in the corresponding election. These variables account for two complementary
theories which have been proposed as explanatory hypothesis for the role of politics on scal
decits. The years left from the current term of the government accounts for the inuence
of elections on scal outcomes, and thus tests for the existence of so-called political cycles
in Europe (see Nordhaus, 1975 and Hibbs, 1977, for basic references on this issue). The
assumption behind the use of the variable is that governments make use of policy instru-
ments prior to elections in order to inuence economic outcomes and benet politically in
terms of the likelihood of being reelected. Empirical studies assessing the impact of elections
on economic variables are existing for Europe (see for example Sapir and Sekkat, 2002, or
Breuss, 2008) and for broader samples of countries (see Mourao and Goncalves Veiga, 2010
for a recent contribution to the literature).
On the other hand, a related strand of literature relates dierences in scal decits to the
relative political power of the government with respect to the opposition. The so-called weak
government hypothesis is based on a theoretical setting put forward by Alesina and Drazen
(1991), which predicts that the diculties associated to reducing budget decits are larger in
coalition governments as compared to single-party governments. From an empirical point of
view, the weak government hypothesis implies that governments formed by single parties (or
coalitions where one party has a dominant position) would be more prone to reduce decits
than coalition governments. Roubini and Sachs (1989), Corsetti and Roubini (1991) and De
Haan et al. (1999) are some examples of empirical work nding evidence of this eect in
20developed countries.
The inclusion of our political variables intends to account for both of these eects as fac-
tors driving budget decits in Europe. The number of years left of the current term should
account for political cycle eects related to the timing of elections, while the share of votes
obtained by the governing party should give us information about the potential existence of
weak government eects in the European sample. Additionally, we include other economic
determinants of budget decits: GDP growth, the share of public debt over GDP and pop-
ulation over 65 years of age (to account for demographic pressure on public nance through
pension payments). These variables are lagged one year so as to ensure a Granger-causal
structure in the model. Since scal decits tend to be relatively persistent over time, we es-
timate a dynamic panel data model including one lag of the dependent variable. The model
is estimated using Arellano and Bond's (1991) Generalized Method of Moments estimator,
which uses lagged levels of the dependent variable to instrument the endogenous lagged vari-
able in a rst-dierenced version of the model.
Table 3: Determinants of scal surplus, EU-25 1995-2008
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged scal surplus 0.435*** 0.344*** 0.332*** 0.383*** 0.374***
[0.117] [0.112] [0.108] [0.119] [0.111]
Debt as a share of GDP 0.0755*** 0.0711*** 0.0718*** 0.0683***
[0.0286] [0.0273] [0.0273] [0.0265]
GDP growth 0.0832 0.0768
[0.0929] [0.0931]
Population over 65 -0.273 -0.226
[0.350] [0.458]
Years left in current term 0.00109* 0.000943* 0.000911* 0.00102* 0.000991*
[0.000639] [0.000548] [0.000544] [0.000560] [0.000555]
Government, share of votes 0.0229*** 0.0164** 0.0158** 0.0151* 0.0150*
[0.00883] [0.00764] [0.00802] [0.00776] [0.00806]
Observations 302 294 296 294 296
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 24
Robust standard errors in brackets. * (**) [***] stands for signicance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level. Dependent variable: scal
surplus. Regression includes year dummies which are not reported. GMM estimation using Arellano and Bond's (1991) GMM
method.
The results of several dierent specications are presented in Table 3. In the rst column
of Table 3 we present the result of a simple regression model where only the lagged de-
pendent variable and the two political covariates are used as explanatory variables. The
budget surplus variable presents positive autocorrelation and our political variables appear
to be signicant determinants of scal outcomes. Furthermore, the estimated parameters for
the political covariates provide evidence of political cycles and weak-government eects in
Europe. On the one hand, budget surpluses tend to decrease as elections approach (that is,
as the variable measuring years remaining in power decreases). On the other hand, strong
governments (in terms of the shares of votes of the government party) tend to have smaller
21budget decits (or higher surpluses) than weaker governments. These results are robust
to the inclusion of other economic variables such as the ones mentioned above, as can be
seen in columns (2) to (5) in Table 3. The only variable which appears robustly related to
scal surpluses is the level of debt. The results indicate that countries whose debt levels
increase tend to carry out scal consolidation measures. This result is strongly inuenced
by the experience of the subsample of countries which, in the run-up to EMU, successfully
implemented consolidation measures in the framework of the Maastricht Treaty.
4.3 The determinants of intra-European trade
Endogeneity between trade integration and business cycle synchronization is the most popu-
lar source of endogeneity of OCA criteria. Since Frankel and Rose (1998) it has been assessed
by using a gravity model. In its origin, the gravity model states that opennes to trade is a
function of income, population and transportation cost variables (Anderson, 1979). Traded-
goods shares of total expenditure of a country with a partner are hypothesized to increase
with income per capita and decrease with country size, and to be negatively aected by
remoteness to trade partners (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003). At the same time, trad-
ing shares are considered to respond to country-specic preferences. When considering the
relationship between trade and business cycle synchronization, several variables have been
included in order to instrument via exogenous variables such a relationship. Those variables
are related to the gravity equation, and include variables representing sources of trade bar-
riers or trade costs as taris and taxation in general, exchange-rate system, institutional
agreements, geographic characteristics (adjacency, distance), cultural factors (common lan-
guage) or level of development of the countries involved in the trading relationship (see
Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004, for a comprehensive analysis of trade costs).
Given our endogenous variable, the problem modeled here is slightly dierent to the typical
problem assessed by the literature (Frankel and Rose, 1998, Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005,
or Inklaar et al., 2008, for example). Many of the variables typically used in bilateral analysis
and, in particular, some variables from gravity equations cannot be utilized as instruments if
aggregated trade data are considered in the analysis, while some others are identied in the
xed country eect from the panel regression specication. Adjacency, distance, common
language, or whether a pair of countries belong to the same development status, cannot be
considered in the analysis.
Integration status variables:
Several dummy variables are constructed in order to account for formal steps in the process
of integration of the countries in our sample. First of all, we will consider the eect of being a
member of the eurozone through a dummy variable for euro-membership. Within the group
of members of the EMU-12, we consider also the particular benets to so-called periphery
countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) by means of another dummy variable. We
also consider separately the potential eect for less-integrated economies by using another
dummy variable for the new EU members from enlargement rounds in 2004 and 2007, tak-
ing a value one when the country becomes part of the EU and zero before that. Finally, we
22consider the group of the opt-out countries (Denmark, Sweden and United Kingdom) with
an additional dummy variable which takes value one from 1999 onwards, when the country
is eectively opting-out for the third stage of EMU.
Trade-demand variables:
Two variables are considered in order to control for the demand for traded goods of a country
in the EU: income per capita and the size of a country in the EU-25 group. The rst one in
this category is the logarithm of the trend of real GDP per capita of a country i with respect
to the average trend-GDP per capita of the EU-25 in period t. Country-specic smoothed
GDP-trends are used which correspond to those estimated via Kalman lter in the time
series models used to extract the cyclical component of GDP. The use of such trends avoids
any conceptual relationship with the concept of cyclical integration, since by denition those
trends are estimated as contemporaneously uncorrelated with the cyclical components used
in the computation of the endogenous variable. A second measure concerns the relative size
of the country, dened as the logarithm of the population share of the EU group in the given
year.10
International competitiveness and trade-specialization variables:
We also include in the model two variables can be related to trade competitiveness of a
country in the EU framework. In the rst place, the dynamics of price dierentials are an
important determinant of trade intensity and we consider the inclusion of the logarithm of
the ratio of Consumer Price Index (CPI) of the country divided by the (mean) EU-CPI.11
In the second place, we consider the following trade-specialization index:












ieu is the share of trade on goods of the kth category as a share of EU-trade of all the
groups of commodities. As well as in the case of trade intensity measures, data are available
from UN COMTRADE. Groups considered are those of the Standard International Trade
Classication Revision 1 (SITC-Rev. 1): Food and live animals; Beverages and tobacco;
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels; Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials; An-
imal and vegetable oils and fats; Chemicals; Manufact goods classied chiey by material;
Machinery and transport equipment; Miscellaneous manufactured articles; Commodities and
transactions not classied according to kind.
10Data on population are sourced from Eurostat.
11Data on CPI are available from Eurostat. Price dierentials seem to be a direct measure of price-
competitiveness. We make use of price dierentials instead of real exchange-rates since the latter is more
exposed to endogeneity with cyclical comovements than the former.
23Table 4 displays the results of several specications of European-trade share variable, TS
1,
on dierent combinations of covariates.12 As can be seen in Table 4, integration-status
variables show signicant eects on trade intensity. Agreements are partly able to explain
dierences in intra-European trade. However, not all the status variables show the expected
sign. It should be noted that the EMU eect is a negative one: being a member of the
monetary union is related to a decrease in the share of European trade. This result is quite
surprising and it should be considered with caution. It could capture trade orientation of
new EU members towards EU partners during the period previous to the enlargements. This
would decrease the share of old EMU members, which changed their European trade focus
earlier, when the implementation of the European single market took place. Another nding
that allows us to call for caution when reading that contradicting EMU negative eect comes
from the negative eect of opting-out for EMU. The impact of joining the EU was signicant
and positive for trade in new member states, pointing out that trade orientation in the new
members coincides in time with reforms implemented close to the date of the enlargement.
Finally, the positive eect of being part of the periphery of the EMU is most probably related
to the eect of macroeconomic (exchange rate) stability gains of those periphery countries
on their trade activity.
GDP per capita shows a positive link with trade, conrming propositions from the gravity
literature (see, for example, Anderson, 1979). Population share does not show a signicant
relationship with trade intensity. If population is considered without the inclusion of GDP
per capita (not shown in Table 4), its sign is negative. However, signicance is restricted
to specications with a very small number of regressors. Price dierentials show a positive
relationship with trade intensity when signicant. The role of trade specialization is signif-
icant in all the specications considered. Its relationship with trade points out that more
specialization induces a gain in European trade participation.13
12The second European-trade intensity measure dened in (8) was also considered as endogenous variable
in this step. However, given the lack of signicant impact on our synchronization measure in OLS regressions
as those in Table ?? we do not focus on this second measure of trade intensity.
13We also included a variable comprising participation in ERM-II and a dummy variable accounting for
the geographic advantage of older EMU members close to Eastern Europe, but they were not signicant in
our relevant specications. We do not show the results including these variables here but they are available

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































254.4 The role of scal policy and trade integration in business cycle
synchronization
The results of the previous sections allow us to identify a set of variables that can be used as
instruments in order to account for the endogeneity of trade integration and scal policy in
our main specication. In particular, we consider the following variables as potential good
instruments for these variables: trade specialization, income per capita trends, geographical
and institutional dummies (for periphery countries, EU, opting-out, and EMU membership
in enlargement rounds) and the political variables which appeared as important determinants
of the scal policy stance (years remaining of term and share of government votes). The
results of the instrumental variable estimation are presented in Table 5.
Table 5: Determinants of business cycle synchronization, IV estimates, EU-25 1995-2008
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Cyclical component -0.709*** -0.669*** -0.566*** -0.536*
[0.206] [0.225] [0.218] [0.320]
Budget surplus 1.224** 0.460** 0.346***
[0.532] [0.204] [0.129]
Trade with EU as % of trade in the EU 0.013** 0.018* 0.023***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Cyclical component  Budget surplus 0.384
[9.856]
Observations 302 325 302 302
Number of countries 24 25 24 24
Robust standard errors in brackets. * (**) [***] stands for signicance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level. Dependent variable:
business cycle synchronization measure. Regression includes country xed eects and year dummies which are not reported.
Instrumental variables estimation with the instruments described in the text.
First of all, the parameter associated to the cyclical component variable is negative and
highly signicant, pointing out that countries are generally more synchronized during reces-
sion periods. The persistent magnitude of this covariate across all the specications reects
the relevance of cyclical state eects. Secondly, budget surplus shows a positive, signicant
impact on cyclical synchronization of a country with respect to the EU. Therefore, it is
possible to assert the relevance of scal consolidation in the SGP framework and the case for
scal rules limiting national discretionality in scal policy measures. Thirdly, trade integra-
tion has a positive signicant impact on synchronization of a country within the EU context.
Moreover, we should remark the magnitude of the eects of scal surplus and trade inten-
sity. A change in one standard deviation in the scal variable changes the synchronization
measure by roughly the same amount as a change in one standard deviation in our trade
intensity variable. The interaction term of the budget surplus and the cyclical component
loses its signicant eect once endogeneity is explicitly addressed. Our results conclude thus
that both scal policy and trade integration are robust an important determinants of cyclical
synchronization in Europe. The importance of scal policy coordination and consolidation
as a prerequisite for the proper functioning of monetary policy in EMU is further reinforced
by our analysis.
264.5 Scenarios for the Austrian economy
Using the estimated model, we turn to analysing dierent scenarios for the Austrian econ-
omy. For that, we create benchmark settings by extrapolating the variables in our model
using the average annual growth rate of the scal surplus, trade integration and the cyclical
component of GDP. Since the period covered by our data includes the rst years after join-
ing the EU, we calculate two benchmark scenarios using growth rates which were calculated
upon the information of two dierent periods: 1995-2008 and 2000-2008.
We then construct two counterfactual scenarios, whose deviations with respect to the bench-
marks are presented in Table 6. The rst one works on the hypothesis of a sharp change in
the trade integration indicator. We materialize such a change by assuming that the trade
integration measure in 2009 takes the value which would correspond to 2013 in the extrap-
olation based on in-sample growth rates. The results indicate that the resulting decrease of
0:5% in the economic integration measure would imply a 1% decrease in the synchronization
of Austria with the EU. A second hypothesis we are interested in is how the synchronization
of the Austrian economy can be aected by changes in the scal decit. In order to answer
this question, we consider an increase of 3% in the decit with respect to the last value in
our sample. In this case, the synchronization measure suers a decrease of 1%.
Table 6: Synchronization scenarios for Austria
Benchmark (average annual growth rate) 1995-2008 2000-2008
Fiscal surplus 0.0038 0.0013
Trade integration -0.0306 0.0112
Cyclical component 0.0005 -0.0015
First scenario: Change in trade integration
Percentage change in trade integration -0.5701 0.2323
Expected percentage change in synchronization -1.0684 0.4448
Second scenario: Change in scal decit
Percentage change in scal policy -2.9981 -2.9993
Expected percentage change in synchronization -1.0408 -1.0412
5 Conclusions
In this piece of research we analyze the role of scal policy and intra-European trade in busi-
ness cycle synchronization in a sample of 25 countries of the EU for the period 1995-2008.
There is a broad theoretical framework pointing towards the fact that the relationships
between scal policy and business cycle comovements and between trade integration and
cyclical synchronization are subject to endogeneity problems. We instrument scal budget
surplus by means of (exogenous) political determinants of scal policy acknowledged by the
literature, while trade integration is instrumented using covariates which summarize the in-
tegration status of countries in the sample, GDP per capita dierences with respect to the
EU and trade specialization within the EU framework. Our results show that both scal
policy and trade integration are important determinants of cyclical synchronization. Follow-
27ing the arguments in Inklaar et al. (2008), we can conclude that whenever a high degree of
trade integration is reached by countries involved in the European integration process, the
role of scal policy is particularly relevant and dierences in scal shocks should be analyzed
in detail as a source of coherence in cyclical comovements in Europe.
There are some caveats to our analysis that should be taken into consideration. The analysis
of cyclical synchronization is plagued with the problem of model uncertainty. Although we
have concentrated our analysis on relatively simple models, the literature oers a large num-
ber of OCA criteria which could be used accounting for potential sources of synchronization,
although nding successful instruments would become a more dicult task as the number of
explanatory variables increases. As the number of potential explanatory variables increases,
there is more uncertainty about the combination of covariates that would explain better
the comovement at cyclical frequencies and methods which are robust to model uncertainty
should be preferred for such applications.
There are several important policy implications from our research, in particular in the con-
text of the recent nancial crisis. Fiscal decits are shown to be an important potential
source of idiosyncratic macroeconomic uctuations, specially in the eurozone. To the extent
that scal objectives are focused on national priorities, their potential harmful eects in
the proper performance of the monetary policy could turn the latter into another source
of asymmetric shocks. Concerning future enlargements of EMU, our results conrm the
rationale of monitoring scal developments to assess the adequacy of potential future EMU
countries. Although the reformed SGP envisages special conditions under periods of intense
recession or crisis, some control upon the national budget developments must be taken into
serious consideration in the form of broader scal coordination steps in Europe. A proper
scal harmonization policy should be reconsidered in order to provide a political framework
for budget coordination and consolidation, and steps towards a risk-sharing mechanism at
the EU level should not be ostracized.
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32Appendix A. Data sources
Table 7: GDP series: Sample and sources






















Slovak Republic 1993q1-2008q4 Eurostat
Spain 1960q1-2008q4 OECD
Sweden 1960q1-2008q4 OECD
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